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Abstract
This study examines the relations between leverage and investment in 
China’s listed firms, where corporate debt is principally provided by state-
owned banks. We obtain three major findings. First, there is a negative 
relation between leverage and investment. Second, the negative relation 
between leverage and investment is weaker in firms with low growth 
opportunities and poor operating performance than in firms with high 
growth opportunities and good operating performance. Third, the negative 
relation between leverage and investment is weaker in firms with a higher 
level of state shareholding than in firms with a lower level of state 
shareholding. Overall, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
state-owned banks in China impose fewer restrictions on the capital 
expenditures of low growth and poorly performing firms and also firms 
with greater state ownership. This creates an over-investment bias in these 
firms. 
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1. Introduction
A significant but controversial issue in finance is the impact that leverage has on a 
firm’s investment decisions. In a frictionless and complete markets world, Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) demonstrate that leverage is irrelevant to a firm’s investment choices 
and to firm value. However, in a world where there are incomplete markets and 
significant agency costs, leverage may have a varied and complex impact on investment. 
For example, managers of highly levered firms may, in some circumstances, be induced 
to forego positive net present value (NPV) projects (Myers, 1977) because some or all of 
the benefits from the investment may accrue to debt-holders; this is known as the debt 
overhang problem and leads to underinvestment. Alternatively, Jensen (1986) and Stulz 
(1990) argue that high leverage in low growth firms is used to discourage management 
from undertaking non-profitable investments. Here, debt pre-commits firms to pay cash 
as interest and principal and such commitments in low growth firms can reduce 
managerial discretion over free cash flows that may have otherwise been allocated to 
negative NPV projects.  In other words, the banks and other debt-holders perform a 
beneficial monitoring and disciplinary role in low growth firms where a high level of 
debt can limit the overinvestment bias caused by managerial agency problems.
In recent years empirical studies have been undertaken to examine the relevance 
of the leverage and capital investment theories. Lang et al. (1996), Aivazian et al. (2005), 
and Ahn et al. (2006) all report a negative relation between investment and leverage 
although the correlation is much stronger for firms with low growth. This evidence is 
consistent with the overinvestment story (Stulz, 1990) where leverage inhibits managers 
of low growth firms from investing in non-profitable capital expenditures. These studies 
use data from the U.S. and Canada where long-term debt finance is provided by profit 
maximizing banks and public bond markets. Here, the debt-holders monitor and 
discipline the firms they lend to. However, the results from these studies do not 
necessarily generalize to transitional economies where the relations between lenders and 
borrowers are more complex and subtle. 
Transitional economies are characterized as having nascent stock markets, an 
absence of public debt markets (or, at most, embryonic public debt markets), and a 
reliance on bank borrowing. Furthermore, most banks are state owned and their decision 
making often reflects the policies dictated by government. Sapienza (2004), Khwaja and 
Mian (2005), and La Porta et al. (2002) argue that state-owned banks are controlled by 
politicians who use the banks to maximize their own political and personal objectives 
such as providing jobs for political supporters and bailing out poorly performing firms. In 
these cases, the banks’ incentives to exert disciplinary pressures on firms are 
compromised. This could be particularly true for the poorly performing and loss making 
firms because the state-owned banks often have the obligation to support them (Cull and 
Xu, 2003; Dobson and Kashyap, 2006). An investigation into the link between leverage 
and investment in an environment where banks are state owned can therefore provide a 
useful addition to the literature. Privately owned banks in developed countries generally 
use commercial criteria in making lending decisions although on some occasions political 
considerations may impinge on the decision process. In transitional or emerging 
economies where banks are owned by the state, political considerations are likely to 
weigh very heavily on lending policies.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relations among investment, 
leverage, growth, and performance for China’s listed firms. We use data from 1991 to 
2004. The opening up of China’s economy and the adoption of free market principles has 
presented many investment opportunities for its listed firms. The mean annual net 
investment by firms exceeds 34% of total assets in place at the beginning of the year and 
this helps account for China’s staggering economic growth rate in the past 20 years. The 
public corporate bond market is extremely small in China and most borrowing comes 
from banks. According to Barth et al.’s (2004) dataset on bank supervision and regulation 
in 152 countries, more than 98% of the banking assets in China are owned and controlled 
by the state. The homogeneity of bank ownership in the country allows us to treat all 
bank loans carried on the listed firms’ balance sheets as loans obtained from state-owned 
banks.  In addition, nearly all China’s listed firms are either directly controlled or 
ultimately owned by the state through pyramid structures (Liu and Sun, 2003).  As state 
owned banks very often display similar biases in their lending to state-owned firms 
(Allen et al. 2005; Brandt and Li, 2003; Cull and Xu, 2003), the homogeneity of bank 
and firm ownership makes China an excellent context to test the link between a firm’s 
investment and the debt financing provided by the state-controlled banks.
Our empirical analysis yields three major results.  First, there is a negative relation 
between leverage and investment. This result is consistent with the existence of a debt 
overhang problem even when banks are state owned rather than privately owned. This 
result suggests that loans from state-owned banks are not an entirely free resource but are 
real financial obligations that listed firms must take into consideration. Second, the 
negative relation between leverage and investment is weaker in firms with low growth 
opportunities and poor operating performance than in firms with high growth 
opportunities and good operating performance. This result is in direct contrast to the 
evidence in the U.S. where low growth firms find it difficult to borrow money to finance 
expansion. Third, the negative relation between leverage and investment is weaker in 
firms with a higher level of state shareholding than in firms with a lower level of state 
shareholding. Overall, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the state-owned 
banks in China impose fewer constraints on capital spending by low growth and poorly 
performing firms and firms with greater state ownership. 
It is possible that leverage could be optimally reduced by management just prior to 
investing in valuable ex post growth opportunities. This implies a potential endogeneity 
problem because managers may reduce leverage in anticipation of future investment 
opportunities (Aivazian et al., 2005). However, most studies (e.g., Lang et al., 1996) use 
pooled OLS which does not take the individual firm effect and potential endogeneity into 
account. In this study, we follow Aivazian et al. (2005) and use fixed effects and 
instrumental variables analyses to adjust for the individual firm effect and to resolve the 
potential endogeneity problem.
Our study contributes to the several strands of research that make up the investment 
and leverage debate. Most empirical studies have used data from the U.S. and other 
developed countries that have a private, or quasi-private, banking sector. Using data from 
China allows us to analyze the investment and leverage relation in a state-controlled 
banking environment that differs quite markedly from those in other countries. Our 
results provide both supports for and against the findings from prior research.
First, we contribute to the empirical literature on the relation between leverage and 
investment. While existing studies find that a high level of corporate borrowing can limit 
the overinvestment bias in low growth firms due to the beneficial monitoring and 
disciplinary roles of private lenders (Lang et al. 1996; Aivazian et al. 2005; and Ahn et 
al. 2006), our study shows that the bail-out obligations of state-owned banks can weaken 
the disciplinary effects and create an overinvestment bias in the low growth and poorly 
performing firms. We believe that the evidence we present constitutes a useful extension 
to the literature, because state ownership of banks is common in countries other than the 
United States (La Porta et al 2002), and so our results can generalize.   
We also extend the research field that examines how the banking environment affects 
corporate finance decisions.  Based on the U.S banking markets, Zarutskie (2006) 
presents evidence that newly formed firms borrow and invest less after an increase in 
competition in the banking sector.  These effects, however, gradually weaken as firms get 
older and finally reverse sign.  After the government reduced its interventions in the 
banking sector, Bertrand et al. (2007) find evidence that French banks are less willing to 
bail out poorly performing firms, and those firms that rely on bank finance are more 
willing to undertake restructuring activities. Cetorelli (2004) shows that enhanced 
competition in the EU banking system fosters the emergence and development of small 
firms. Similarly, Beck et al. (2004) offer international evidence that more banking 
competition is associated with fewer financial obstacles for small firms. Most recently, 
González and González (2008) show that firm leverage increases with greater bank 
concentration and stronger protection of creditor rights based on a sample of firms cross 
39 countries. While studies in this strand of literature focus on the degree of competition 
in the banking sector, our study examines a new dimension of the banking environment - 
the ownership nature of the banks.  We show that, under the state ownership of banks, 
corporate investment will be affected not only by firm-specific economic and financial 
factors but also the banks’ politically-determined lending policies.  In our case, the low 
growth and poorly performing firms as well as firms with a higher state ownership stake 
tend to have a higher level of investment due to the more lenient lending policies of 
banks.   As far as we aware, the evidence we present on the implication of bank 
ownership on corporate investment has not been documented by the prior studies. 
Our study also relates to the literature on the roles of corporate debt as an instrument 
of corporate governance.  Corporate finance theories suggest that creditors, including 
commercial banks and trade credit suppliers, have the incentives and capacity to 
discipline poorly performing managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Diamond, 1984). 
Kang and Shivdasani (1995), for example, find that Japanese firms with close ties to a 
main bank demonstrate a higher incidence of CEO turnover in response to poor 
performance than firms that do not have such a relationship.  Based on the analysis of the 
market reactions to more than 800 loan announcements, Byers et al. (2008) show that 
these loan announcements are more likely to be associated with positive wealth effects 
for firms with weak internal and external corporate governance. Thus, corporate 
borrowing leads to closer monitoring of the firm by the banks that provide the loans. All 
these studies suggest that commercial banks are able to perform a beneficial role in 
corporate governance.  Some studies, however, show that there are agency costs of debt 
(particularly in high risk firms) due to the different payoff structures of shareholders and 
bondholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Krosznera and Straham, 2001; Byrd and 
Mizruchi, 2005).  Krosznera and Straham (2001) find that bankers only sit on the boards 
of firms when the conflicts of interests between shareholders and bondholders are low.   
Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) show that firms that have a banker on the board are associated 
with a lower debt ratio. Our findings complement these studies by offering evidence that 
bank lending in China reduces the negative links between leverage and investment in low 
growth and poorly performing firms. This in turn suggests that the disciplinary and 
monitoring roles of banks in low growth and poorly performing firms might have been 
compromised due to state-owned banks’ obligations to bail these firms out.  
 At a practical level, our study provides useful information on the investment 
behaviors of China’s listed firms and the lending behaviors of China’s state-owned 
banks. This is clearly of interest to both policy makers and investors. For example, the 
results from our study may help policy makers to better assess the effects of reducing 
state intervention in the banking sector on the financing of industrial enterprises. If banks 
are fully privatized then they are likely to base their lending decisions primarily on 
commercial considerations. Even partially or fully state-owned banks will increasingly 
need to use commercial considerations so that they can compete with the influx of 
foreign banks that have arrived after the relaxation of entry barriers to the banking sector. 
Banks’ uses of commercial considerations in lending decisions will likely lead to funding 
and liquidity crises for poorly performing firms. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we provide a 
brief review of the related literature.  The econometric models that we use are discussed 
in section 3. In section 4, empirical results and robustness checks are presented. Section 5 
summarizes and concludes the paper.
2. Related Literature
Our study connects separate literatures that examine the links between leverage 
and investment, the lending behavior of state-owned banks, the evolution of China’s 
banking sector and the ownership structure of China’s listed firms. In this section, we 
review the previous literature and evidence in each of these streams of research. Our 
research contributes directly to each of the streams of research discussed below. At a 
basic level, we corroborate prior research on the link between investment and leverage. 
We then extend prior research by delving into the role of state-owned banks, policy 
leading, and ownership of firms.
2.1. Prior Evidence on the Relation between Leverage and Investment
As we discussed in the introduction, leverage may induce underinvestment in some 
circumstances because the benefits accrue, at least partially, to the creditors rather than 
accruing fully to the shareholders. On the other hand, leverage can alleviate the agency 
problem of investing in negative NPV projects by constraining “overinvestment” in low 
growth firms. The existing evidence from North America largely supports these 
implications.  McConnell and Servaes (1995) show that the value of U.S. firms is 
negatively correlated with leverage for high growth firms (indicated by high Tobin’s Q), 
and positively correlated with leverage for low growth firms (or low Tobin’s Q).  Lang et 
al. (1996) find a strong negative relation between leverage and subsequent investment, 
but only for firms with weak growth opportunities (with Tobin’s Q less than one).  Based 
on evidence from Canadian firms, Aivazian et al. (2005) also offer evidence for a 
significantly negative impact of leverage on investment, with the negative relation 
stronger for low growth firms. The results provide support to agency theories of 
corporate leverage, and especially the theory that leverage has played a disciplinary role 
for firms with low growth opportunities. Recently, Ahn et al. (2006) document that the 
negative relation between leverage and investment in diversified firms is significantly 
stronger for high Q segments than for low Q business segments, and is significantly 
stronger for non-core segments than for core segments. Among low growth firms, the 
positive relation between leverage and firm value is significantly weaker in diversified 
firms than in focused firms. Their results suggest that the disciplinary benefits of debt are 
partially offset by the additional managerial discretion in allocating debt service to 
different business segments within a diversified organizational structure.
2.2. State-Owned Banks 
Private and state-owned banks tend to operate with different objectives; private 
banks primarily aim to maximize the returns on capital contributed by its shareholders 
while state-owned banks follow the objectives set by politicians and bureaucrats to serve 
political and personal objectives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Sapienza, 2004; Dinc, 
2005). Given the different objectives and incentive structures, private and state-owned 
banks tend to have different lending behaviors where loans are allocated and priced 
differently.  While private banks tend to allocate and price loans according to borrowers’ 
risk profiles, state-owned banks tend to allocate and price loans according to the 
preferences and priorities of governments.  Several cross-country studies (e.g., La Porta 
et al., 2002) show that in countries with state-owned banks, the banks lend largely to 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Based on firm-level data, Sapienza (2004) finds that 
state-owned banks mostly favor large firms and firms located in depressed areas.  
Lending behavior is also affected by the party affiliated with the bank: the stronger the 
political party in the area where the firm is borrowing, the lower the interest rate charged. 
Dinc (2005) documents that state-owned banks increase their lending during election 
years, relative to the lending made by private banks. Bertrand et al. (2007), on the other 
hand, show that state-controlled French banks tend to provide subsidized loans to bail out 
poorly performing firms. As banks’ allocation and pricing of loans have implications for 
firms’ free cash flows and evaluations of projects, the ownership nature of the bank 
affects the relations between leverage and investment.  Empirical evidence on the effect 
of leverage on investment under the state ownership of a bank therefore provides a useful 
addition to the literature.  
2.3. China’s Bank Sector and its Lending Behavior
After more than two decades of economic transition where China has been 
gradually transformed into a market economy, China still manages to maintain dominant 
state ownership in her banking sector in order to channel bank deposits to the ailing 
SOEs (Allen et al., 2005; Dobson and Kashyap, 2006).  As Dobson and Kashyap (2006) 
point out (p.117), “China’s banking system still has the highest share of government 
ownership (almost 100 percent) in the world. The pessimistic interpretation, that the 
government is retaining ownership in order to preserve the option to direct credit, is 
reinforced by the fact that the government has done little to promote the development of a 
bond market. Instead virtually all debt financing in China is done through the banks”. As 
support for the latter stylized fact, bank statistics show that although the private sector 
accounts for 50 percent of the economy it accounts for just 7 percent of bank lending.
 State-owned banks’ obligations to lend to SOEs is widely regarded as a major 
cause of China’s enormous level of non-performing bank loans.  On the one hand, loss 
making or poorly performing SOEs are usually firms with poor fundamentals and thus 
inherently have a high default risk.  On the other hand, the state-owned banks are also 
able to ignore the non-performing loans on the grounds that they were caused by their 
obligations to bailout the state-owned firms and therefore it is the central government 
who has to bear the final responsibility for the consequences.  This provides state-owned 
banks with legitimate grounds to ignore the quality of loans, even though some of the bad 
loans are caused by a lack of due-diligence monitoring or corrupt behaviors on the part of 
bank officials rather than the policy lending itself. Consequently, banks in China have 
been saddled with extensive portfolios of non-performing loans. An official estimation of 
the non-performing loans of the “big four” banks as at the end of 2003 amounted to 2.4 
trillion yuan (US$ 290 billion), or 23% of the total loans outstanding while the unofficial 
amount is even higher (about 3.5 trillion yuan) (The Economist, Dec. 4, 2003).   
State-owned banks’ policy lending not only leads to the accumulation of non-
performing loans but also distorts firms’ investment decisions. Through the leverage-
investment link, it is argued that the policy lending of state-owned banks would 
eventually affect capital allocation efficiency and thus the economic growth of the 
economy (Dobson and Kashyap, 2006).  Despite the importance of the topic, very few 
empirical studies have been carried out due to the problem of data availability. Brandt 
and Li (2003) show that China’s state-owned banks discriminate against private firms in 
their lending decisions.  Cull and Xu (2003) find that state banks have grown 
increasingly inefficient in allocating credit since the mid-1990s as they have been 
increasingly forced to bail out poorly performing SOEs. A recent paper has shown that, 
before 2001, there was a negative relationship between bank loans and firm profitability 
not only in SOEs but also in private firms (Cull et al., 2007). This suggests that the state 
owned banks might have offered a helping hand not only to the ailing SOEs but also 
private firms. Our study adds to the literature by using updated data and by exploring 
explicitly the impact of the banks’ policy lending on firms’ investment policies.
China’s stock market was created as a fund-raising venue for SOEs (Wong, 
2006).  As a result, the majority of China’s listed firms are controlled by state 
shareholders who retain their dominant control over the listed firms through their 
ownership of about two-thirds of the total equity in the form of non-tradable state-owned 
shares (Firth et al., 2006; Lin and Su, 2008). We use the ownership structure of China’s 
listed firms to help us to investigate how politically-motivated lending by state owned 
banks can affect the firms’ leverage-investment link.  In particular, the variations in the 
degree of state ownership enable us to examine whether the state owned banks treat state-
owned firms more favorably in their lending decisions and how such distortion affects 
firm investment.  The availability of detailed financial data also allows us to examine 
how the bail-out obligations of the state-owned banks affect firm investment. State 
owned banks in China have an additional incentive to bail out the poorly performing 
listed firms because a listed firm which has experienced losses for two consecutive years 
may face de-listing if it cannot return to profitability. In order to preserve the rights to 
equity financing, local governments in China have strong incentives to provide the loss 
making listed firms with bank loans and subsidies (Bai et al. 2003; Pistor and Xu, 2005).
3. Model Specifications
Following previous studies (Aivazian et al., 2005), we employ an investment 
equation to explore the impacts of bank loans on firm investment.  Specifically, the 
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(1)
where tiInvestment ,  is the ratio of net capital expenditure (capital expenditure minus 
depreciation) of firm i to total assets for the current year; 1−itLeverage  is the lagged one 
time period ratio of total bank loans to book value of total assets. We use Tobin’s Q as a 
measure of growth and performance. 1,' −tisQTobin  is the lagged one time period 
sQTobin'  for firm i  at time t ; following previous studies (Chung and Pruitt, 1994), 
sQTobin'  is calculated as follows. sQTobin'  = (MVCS + BVPS + BVLTD + BVINV + 
BVCL − BVCA) / BVTA, where MVCS is the market value of the firm’s common stock, 
BVPS is the book value of the firm’s preferred stock, BVLTD is the book value of the 
firm’s long-term debt, BVINV is the book value of the firm’s inventories, BVCL is the 
book value of the firm’s current liabilities, BVCA is the book value of the firm’s current 
assets, and BVTA is the book value of the firm’s total assets. Because no preferred stock 
exists in China, the above formula reduces to (MVCS + BVLTD + BVINV + BVCL − 
BVCA) / BVTA. In addition, we adjust the measurement of Tobin’s Q to take account of 
illiquidity discounts of 70% in the Chinese market (Chen and Xiong, 2002). Specifically, 
we multiply the amount of tradable shares by the market price and the amount of non-
tradable shares by 30% of the market share price to obtain the value of equity in the 
above formula.  Consistent with the previous studies, we create a dummy variable, 
1,' −tisQDTobin , which equals 1 if 1,' −tisQTobin  is less than the industry median value in 
that year and zero otherwise. 
We follow prior studies to control for firms’ cash flow and sales conditions.  
tiCashFlow ,  is the ratio of the operating cash flow of the firm to lagged one time period 
total assets; it is a measure of a firm’s profitability. 1, −tiSale  is the lagged one time period 
ratio of net sales of the firm to net fixed assets. Other control variables such as state 
ownership, firm size, and firm age are included in the model. tiState ,  is the percentage of 
the state-owned shares in firm i at time t ; tiSizeFirm ,  is measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets; tiAgeFirm ,  is the number of years since the firm went public. 
DummiesTime  are used to capture the potential differences in the macroeconomic 
environment over the years. 
Most previous studies (e.g., Lang et al., 1996; Ahn et al., 2006) assume that the 
unobservable individual firm effect is zero and use a pooled regression to estimate the 
investment function. As Aivazian et al. (2005) point out (p. 282), “the assumption of zero 
unobservable individual effect is too strong given that there is large heterogeneity across 
industries and across firms within the same industry.” For instance, if a firm has a good 
political connection with government officials, the firm may find it relatively easy to get 
a bank loan and acquire valuable projects from the government. Therefore, ignoring the 
unobservable factors creates an endogeneity problem and makes the estimation results 
biased. In this study, we follow Aivazian et al. (2005) and use the firm fixed effect 
(demeaned estimation) panel regression estimation to eliminate the non-observed time 
invariant firm effect. iλ  and ti,ε  in Equation 1 refer to the individual firm fixed effect 
and the error term respectively. 
There are potential problems in using market-based variables as growth and 
performance measures in emerging markets. For instance, since the stock market in 
China is far from being well developed, changes in stock prices may be poor indicators of 
changes in a firm’s fundamental value (Allen et al., 2005). Morck et al. (2000) find that 
more than 80% of the stocks listed on the exchanges in China move in the same direction 
in a given week, which suggests that stock returns in China are less informative of firm 
performance than in developed economies, because they tend to reflect market-level 
information rather than firm-specific information. Hence, we use sales growth 
( tiGrowth , ), which is the ratio of net sales in the current year to the average net sales over 
the previous three years, to capture the growth prospect of a listed firm.  If we use the 
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 (2)
where tiDGrowth ,  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if tiGrowth ,  is less than the industry 
median value in that year.  The other variables are defined as previously. 
We estimate two sets of models to explicitly examine two politically-motivated 
lending distortions introduced by China’s state-owned banks, namely, bailing out of loss-
making firms and more lenient lending to state-owned firms.  We estimate the following 










                   
 
4 (3)              
where tiDLoss ,  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is loss making ( tiCashFlow ,  is 
negative) in that year. A positive coefficient on the interaction term between  tiDLoss ,  
and 1−itLeverage  will be consistent with our hypothesis that state owned banks impose 
fewer investment restrictions on low growth (more poorly performing) firms.










                   
 
4  (4)
where t,iDState  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the amount of state-owned shares is 
greater than the median value.  We expect the coefficient on the interaction term between 
t,iDState  and 1−itLeverage  will be positive if the banks are more willing to lend to firms 
with greater state ownership. 
4. Summary Statistics and Results
4.1. Summary Statistics
The sample used in this study consists of 1,203 firms listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China during 1991 - 2004. The firms in the 
financial sector are excluded from the sample in order to make the sample more 
homogenous. Our final sample is an unbalanced panel that consists of 5,999 firm-year 
observations.  Since Growth is calculated based on the previous three years’ data, the 
sample size is smaller (4186) for models that use Growth as an independent variable. The 
data are from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR). 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the key variables.  
[Table 1 here]
As can be seen from Table 1, the mean of the ratio of net investment to fixed assets 
is 0.341, which is much higher than that reported in western literature (e.g., 0.17 in 
Canada, Aivazian et al., 2005).  The sample average Tobin’s Q is 1.231 and the standard 
deviation is 0.731. The average growth rate is 43.2%. The growth rate indicates strong 
growth opportunities for Chinese firms over our sample period. The mean of the ratio of 
bank loans to total assets is 0.223, which suggests that there is a significant reliance on 
bank loan finance by Chinese listed firms. 
  The correlation matrix of the variables is presented in Table 2. As can be seen, all 
the correlation coefficients are less than absolute 0.46, which suggests that 
multicollinearity is not a serious problem in the sample. Leverage is negatively and 
significantly related to investment, which provides some preliminary evidence of an 
inverse relation between investment and leverage.
[Table 2 here]
4.2 Empirical Results
The results of our baseline models are provided in Table 3.  As can be seen from 
the table, the coefficients on Leverage are negative in all regressions and are statistically 
significant in 7 of the 9 regressions (Columns 4 and 6 being the exceptions). This result 
contrasts with other studies that argue that state-owned banks do not impose discipline on 
firms (Kornai et al., 2003). In other words, the listed firms do take their outstanding bank 
loans into account when making investment decisions. The significant coefficients on the 
Leverage  variable range from -0.17 to -0.413 and this suggests that a 0.1 increase in 
leverage will reduce the investment to capital ratio by 0.017 to 0.0413. sQTobin'  and 
Growth  are positively and significantly associated with the investment, which echoes the 
findings by Aivazian (2005). This indicates that firms with better growth prospects tend 
to invest more.
[Table 3 here]
The interaction term between the leverage and growth/performance measures is 
the key variable in the analysis. The interaction term allows us to examine how the 
banks’ bail out policies affect the leverage and investment links in low growth (or poorly 
performing) firms. As can be seen from Column 8 in Table 3, the coefficient of the 
interaction term between DLoss  and Leverage  is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level, suggesting that leverage has a weaker negative impact on investment for 
loss making firms. The coefficient on the interaction term between DGrowth  and 
Leverage  is also positive and statistically significant at 1% level (Column 5).  The 
coefficient on the interaction term between Leverage  and sQDTobin'  is, however, 
statistically insignificant (Column 2). Overall, the results are consistent with our 
expectation that state-owned banks are obliged to provide a helping hand to low growth 
and poorly performing state-owned firms due to political goals and soft budget 
constraints. The result is opposite to the findings in developed countries (e.g., Lang et al., 
1996; Aivazian et al., 2005), which find that the negative relation between leverage and 
investment is stronger for lower growth firms. As Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) point 
out, the negative relation between leverage and investment could be beneficial for 
shareholders of low growth and poorly performing firms because the outstanding debt 
limits managerial discretion over free cash flow. However, in China’s case, we find that 
the negative relation between leverage and investment is significantly weaker for low 
growth and poorly performing firms than for high growth and better performing firms. 
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the state-owned banks in China 
impose fewer restrictions on investment spending by low growth and poorly performing 
listed firms. This offsets the potential disciplinary effect of leverage and creates an over-
investment bias in these firms. 
The interaction term between state ownership and leverage is another key variable 
of our analysis.  This allows us to capture how the banks’ positive biases towards state-
owned firms affect the leverage and investment links. As shown by Columns 3 and 9 in 
table 3, the interaction terms between  t,iDState  and 1−itLeverage  are positive and 
significant at 5 % in models where sQTobin'  and Accounting Performance (Cash Flow) 
are used as the performance measures. t,iDState * 1−itLeverage  is positive but statistically 
insignificant in the model where Growth  is used as the performance measure. Overall, 
our results suggest that the negative relation between leverage and investment is weaker 
for firms with a higher level of state shareholding. The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the state-owned banks are more lenient in their lending to firms with 
greater state ownership.
 Regarding the other control variables, the coefficients on Sale have a positive and 
significant effect on investment. The coefficients on State are negative but are not 
significant (except at the 0.10 level in columns 3 and 9). The results are consistent with 
the results obtained by Cull and Xu (2006), who find that state-owned firms tend to have 
a lower re-investment rate than private firms. Larger size firms (Firm Size) and firms 
with good performance (CashFlow) invest more. 
  
4.3. Instrumental Variables (IV) and Two-Stage Least Square Estimation
Our results are likely to suffer from endogeneity problems because leverage is 
endogenously determined by firms rather than exogenously given (Aivazian et al., 2005). 
Given that a firm’s leverage decision is likely to be correlated with investment 
opportunities, leverage will be correlated with the error terms in our investment models 
and its estimates will be biased if there are some common factors that affect leverage and 
investment opportunities but are omitted from the investment models. The fixed effect 
estimation partially alleviates this problem by eliminating the unobservable and time-
invariant firm characteristics. However, it is still possible that the managers reduce 
leverage in anticipation of future investment opportunities so that we observe a negative 
relation between leverage and investment. We therefore adopt a two-stage instrumental 
variable approach to deal with the endogeneity problem pertaining to the relations 
between leverage and investment.  In the first stage, we estimate a firm’s leverage 
decision and obtain a predicted leverage level for each firm. In the second stage, we use 
the predicted leverage level as a generated instrument variable for leverage and then re-
estimate the investment models.  
In estimating a firm’s leverage choice, we follow the recent literature and use a 
variety of instrumental variables. First, we follow Aivazian et al. (2005) and Molina 
(2005) and use Tangibility, defined as the proportion of the value of tangible assets to 
total assets, as an instrumental variable. yTangibilit  is potentially a good instrumental 
variable because it tends to reduce bankruptcy costs and therefore increases the use of 
leverage. Furthermore, yTangibilit  is unlikely to be correlated with a firm’s investment 
opportunities (Aivazian et al., 2005). Second, the literature suggests that the non-debt tax 
shield (NDTS), the tax deduction for depreciation, is a potentially important determinant 
of leverage choice. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) point out that non-debt tax shields are 
substitutes for the tax benefits of debt financing and a firm with larger non-debt tax 
shields is therefore more likely to use less debt. Using data from 1200 listed companies in 
China, Huang and Song (2006) find strong empirical evidence to support this theoretical 
prediction. Following Huang and Song (2006), we use depreciation and amortization 
scaled by total assets to proxy for NDTS, which is employed as an instrumental variable 
in our analysis. Third, Myers (1977) argues that firms can match the maturities of their 
assets and liabilities to reduce underinvestment problems, suggesting a positive link 
between the asset maturity and the use of long term debt. Asset Maturity is therefore used 
as an instrumental variable by Johnson (2003) and Billett et al. (2007) in their system of 
leverage, growth and maturity equations. Following Guedes and Opler (1996), we use 
Asset Maturity as an additional instrumental variable. We expect a positive link between 
the asset maturity and the use of bank loans, the main source of long term debt to firms. 
Fourth, we use the Earnings Volatility measure, defined as the standard deviation of 
EBIT/total assets over past three years, as an additional instrumental variable. As Bradley 
et al. (1984) and Johnson (2003) point out, firms with greater earnings volatility should 
have lower leverage. We therefore expect a negative link between Earnings Volatility 
and leverage. Lastly, we follow Grullon et al. (2006) and use average industry leverage 
as an instrumental variable. The literature (e.g., Bradley et al., 1984; Grullon et al., 2006) 
suggests that firms’ leverage decisions are heavily influenced by the leverage ratio of 
industry peers since firms in the same industry tend to share commonalities in the factors 
that affect their capital structure. Thus, the average industry leverage should be a 
reasonably good instrumental variables of the leverage for a specific firm (Grullon et al., 
2006).  
We model a firm’s leverage decision as a function of the instrumental 
variables as well as all the control variables in the investment decision model, with all the 
variables lagged one year to those used in the investment regressions. Consistent with our 
expectation, most instrumental variables enter the first stage regressions significantly and 
with their expected signs. For instance, NDTS is negatively and statistically significantly 
(at the 5% level) associated with the leverage ratio; Asset Maturity is positively and 
statistically significantly (at the 5% level) associated with the leverage ratio; Earning 
Volatility is negatively and statistically significantly (at the 5% level) associated with the 
leverage ratio; and Industry Average Leverage is positively and statistically significantly 
(at the 1% level) associated with the leverage ratio. Tangibility does not enter the first 
stage regressions significantly. We conduct an F-test of the exogenous IV variables in the 
first-stage regressions. The null hypothesis of the test is that the instruments do not 
explain differences in corporate leverage. We reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level in 
all model specifications. For brevity, the first-stage regressions are not reported but are 
available from the authors upon request. We obtain the fitted values of leverage and use 
them as generated instruments for Leverage  and then re-estimate our investment models. 
The results of the instrumental variable estimation are reported in Table 4.  
[Table 4 here]
As we can see from the table, the coefficients on Leverage  are negative and are 
statistically significant. The coefficients range in value from -0.993 to -1.412. Consistent 
with our previous findings, Tobin’s Q and sales growth are positive and are significant in 
columns 1, 2, 3, and 5. The interaction term between DLoss  and Leverage  (b=0.542, p
<0.01) is also positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on the 
interaction term between DGrowth  and Leverage  is positive and statistically significant 
at the 5% level (b=0.207, p<0.05), though the coefficient of the interaction terms between 
Leverage  and sQDTobin'  is statistically insignificant. In addition, the interaction of 
DState and Leverage is positively and statistically significant at the 1% level (the 
coefficients range from 0.527 to 0.561, p<0.01). All these results confirm our findings 
from Table 3 that leverage has a weaker negative impact on investment for poorly 
performing firms, loss making firms, and state-controlled firms. Our results are therefore 
robust after dealing with the issue of endogeneity.   
In addition, the IV coefficients are somewhat larger than the OLS coefficients, 
indicating the existence of potential measurement error, which would tend to “attenuate” 
the coefficient estimate toward zero (Laeven and Levine, 2007; Rajan and Subramanian, 
2005). It is also worth noting that our main results do not depend on instrumentation, 
although the latter increases the significance and magnitude of the coefficients.  In fact, 
this is a regular finding in the finance and growth literature (e.g., Molina, 2005; Laeven 
and Levine, 2007; Laeven and Woodruff, 2007; Barth et al., 2008).  It should also be 
noted that in our fixed effect models without instrumentation, there is essentially no or 
very small negative correlations between leverage and investment for low-growth and 
poorly performing firms, which indicates the complete absence of monitoring effects.  
However, in the IV estimates, there is a significant negative relation between leverage 
and investment for these firms. The IV results suggest that there are some investment 
restrictions from the banks, although they are much weaker than those of the high-growth 
and well performing firms. Nevertheless, the results from both estimation methods 
indicate that the state-owned banks are more lenient in their lending to low growth and 
poorly performing firms than the high growth and well-performing firms.  
4.4. Alternative Explanations and Additional Robustness Tests 
Tables 3 and 4 show that the interaction terms between tiDGrowth , and Leverage  
and DLoss  and Leverage  are significantly positive. We interpret our findings by a 
partial efficiency story in which the state banks successfully monitor firms that perform 
well (see the negative debt-investment correlation) but impose fewer constraints on 
investment for poorly performing firms and firms with greater state ownership. 
Nevertheless, there are also two possible alternative explanations. The first explanation 
(explanation A) is that state banks are fully (privately) inefficient in that the negative 
leverage-investment relation reflects the state's desire to "bail-out" firms rather than 
bank monitoring.  One possible cause for the positive interaction terms between 
tiDGrowth , and Leverage , and DLoss  and Leverage, is the existence of a cap on the 
extent of bailout to poorly performing firms. As a result, most of the poorly performing 
firms show similar leverage levels because they are close to a bailout cap imposed by 
the state-owned banks. On the other hand, state banks can also be fully (privately) 
efficient (explanation B). In this case, the positive interactions terms can be caused by 
the fact that the low growth firms essentially have very little investment so that the 
monitoring actions of bank financing are unlikely to show up in investment. Our 
previous finding about the positive interactive term between DState and Leverage 
already lends us some confidence that explanation i may not be the case. This is because 
under explanation A, the investment-leverage link would be even stronger for firms with 
greater state ownership if the tendency to bail out state firms in times of trouble is even 
higher. In contrast, we find that the investment-leverage link is weaker for state 
controlled firms. Nevertheless, in order to test these possibilities more directly, we 
divide sample firms into poorly performing and out-performing by using the mean value 
of Growth  and tiCashFlow , respectively and then test the equality of the variation of 
Leverage and Investment between the poorly performing firms and the out-performing 
firms.  Under the fully inefficient story, the variation in leverage will be smaller in the 
sample of poorly performing firms than in the out-performing firms. Under the fully 
efficient story, the variation in investment will be smaller in the poorly performing firms 
than in the out-performing firms because of the limited investment opportunities. 
Results are reported in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 5]
As can be seen from the table, the standard deviations of leverage for the bottom 
and top performing firms are not statistically different (in fact the standard deviations 
for the poor performers are actually slightly greater than for the top performers) Thus, 
explanation A is rejected by the variance comparison tests. This evidence echoes our 
previous findings and suggests that the fully inefficient (explanation A) explanation is 
not appropriate in our context. Furthermore, we find a similar pattern that the standard 
deviations of investment for the bottom performing firms are actually greater than those 
of the upper performing firms. Thus, explanation B is rejected by the variance 
comparison tests. This helps us rule out the fully efficient (explanation B) explanation. 
Second, there is likely to be significant heterogeneity in firms’ investment 
behaviors and banks’ lending behaviors because of differences in industry structures. As 
Parrino (1997) points out, by filtering out the common factors within an industry such as 
shocks that are beyond managers’ control, relative performance evaluation (RPE) 
provides more precise information about a firm’s performance. We use industry-adjusted 
variables, calculated as the difference between a firm’s own characteristics and the 
industry average value, to filter out the industry effect. The results, reported in Table 6, 
are very similar to our previous findings. The coefficients on Leverage  remain negative 
and statistically significant in models where sales growth and financial performance are 
used as the performance measures. Consistent with our previous findings, sQTobin'  and 
Growth  are positively and significantly associated with investment, suggesting that firms 
with better growth prospects tend to invest more. The coefficient on the interaction term 
DLoss  and Leverage  is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
coefficient on the interaction term between DGrowth  and Leverage  is positive but 
statistically significant only at the 10% level. The coefficient on the interaction between 
Leverage  and sQDTobin'  is statistically insignificant. Similarly, t,iDState * 1−itLeverage  
are significantly positive in models where sQTobin'  and Accounting Performance (Cash 
Flow) are used as the performance measures; a positive but statistically insignificant 
coefficient is shown when Growth  is used as the performance measure.  Our results are 
therefore robust to dealing with the issue of industry heterogeneity.   
[Table 6 here]
5. Conclusion
This study examines the relations between leverage and investment among 
China’s listed firms where banks are state owned.  We offer three main findings.  First, 
there is a negative relation between leverage and investment. This result indicates the 
existence of a debt overhang problem even when banks are state owned rather than 
privately owned. Second, the negative relation between leverage and investment is 
weaker in firms with low growth opportunities and poor operating performance than for 
firms with high growth opportunities and good operating performance. Third, the 
negative relation between leverage and investment is weaker in firms with a higher level 
of state shareholding than in firms with a lower level of state shareholding. Overall, this 
result is consistent with the hypothesis that the state-owned banks in China tend to 
impose less restrictions on the capital expenditure investments of low growth (and poorly 
performing) listed firms and also for firms with a high state ownership. To the extent that 
low growth and poorly performing firms tend to have fewer profitable investment 
projects than high growth and better performing firms, our study suggests that the 
political obligation of the state-owned banks to support ailing firms makes them unable 
to play a monitoring and disciplining role in preventing overinvestment by low growth 
and poorly performing firms. Furthermore, prior studies have documented that Chinese 
listed firms with greater state shareholding tend to be associated with lower corporate 
performance (Xu and Wong, 1999; Sun and Tong, 2003). The more lenient lending 
policies on the part of state owned banks also create an over-investment bias in these 
firms. Our study therefore provides some evidence on how state ownership of banks 
creates distortions in firms’ real investment behaviors via the leverage-investment links.  
Table 1. Summary Statistics
This table provides the summary statistics of the key variables included in our analysis. 
tiInvestment ,  is the ratio of net capital expenditure (capital expenditure minus depreciation) of firm i to 
total assets for the current year; 1, −tiLeverage  is the lagged one time period ratio of total bank loans to 
book value of total assets. 1,
' −tisQTobin  is the lagged one time period sQTobin'  for firm i  at time t ;. 
Growth is the ratio of net sales in the current year to the average net sales over the previous three years. 
tiCashFlow ,  is the ratio of  the operating cash flow of the firm to lagged one time period total assets;  
1, −tiSale  is the lagged one time period ratio of net sales of the firm to net fixed assets. tiState ,  is a 
dummy variable equals one if  the firm i at time t is state controlled; tiSizeFirm ,  is measured by the 
natural logarithm of total assets
N Mean Median Standard deviation Min Max
testment 5999 0.341 0.148 0.566 -0.100 4.487 
1' −tsQbin 5999 1.231 1.048 0.731 0.267 8.569 
1−tverage 5999 0.223 0.211 0.132 0.000 0.830 
towth 4186 0.432 0.278 1.034 -2.312 23.122 
1−tle 5999 2.297 1.714 1.869 0.120 9.798 
tshFlow 5999 0.072 0.065 0.084 -0.492 0.967 
tte 5999 0.363 0.000 0.481 0.000 1.000 
tSizerm 5999 20.964 20.901 0.922 18.073 26.855 
Table 2. Correlation matrix
This table reports the correlation coefficients of the key variables included in our analysis.  
tiInvestment ,  is the ratio of net capital expenditure (capital expenditure minus depreciation) of firm i to 
total assets for the current year; 1, −ti
Leverage
 is the lagged one time period ratio of total bank loans to 
book value of total assets. 1,
' −tisQTobin  is the lagged one time period sQTobin'  for firm i  at time t ;. 
Growth is the ratio of net sales in the current year to the average net sales over the previous three years. 
tiCashFlow ,  is the ratio of  the operating cash flow of the firm to lagged one time period total assets;  
1, −tiSale  is the lagged one time period ratio of net sales of the firm to net fixed assets. tiState ,  is a 
dummy variable equals one if  the firm i at time t is state controlled; tiSizeFirm ,  is measured by the 
natural logarithm of total assets
Investment ti, Tobin’s Q 1, −ti Leverage 1, −ti Growth ti, Sales 1−t Cash flow ti,
State ti, Firm Size ti,
Investment ti, 1
Tobin’s Q 1, −ti 0.061*** 1
Leverage 1−t -0.0347*** -0.0163** 1
Growth 0.1378*** 0.0439*** 0.0286* 1
Sales 0.1555*** -0.0555*** -0.0616*** 0.0316* 1
Cash flow t 0.2607*** 0.0572*** -0.1934*** 0.2707*** 0.0231*** 1
State -0.0785*** -0.1407*** -0.0618*** -0.0527*** -0.0381*** 0.0548***
1
Firm Size 0.0562* -0.4567*** 0.0387*** 0.0987*** 0.0646 0.2345***
0.1874 1
          Table 3.  The Relation between Bank Loan and Investment in China (Firm 
Fixed Effect Models)   
This table reports the estimates obtained from the firm fixed effect models.  The dependent variable is 
tiInvestment ,  as defined in Table 1. Tables 1-3 use Tobin’s Q as the performance measure, Tables 4-6 use sale 
growth as the performance measures.  Tables 7-9 use accounting performance as the performance measure.  
Tobin’s Q Performance Sale Growth Performance
Accounting Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(7) (8) (9)
Leverage t-1 -0.332 -0.295 -0.413 -0.084 -0.170 -
0.141 -0.309 -0.404 -0.394
(-3.803)*** (-3.190)*** (-4.282)*** (-0.852) (-1.647)* (-
1.298) (-3.539)*** (-4.530)*** (-4.081)***
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.064 0.057 0.063
(4.203)*** (3.549)*** (4.160)***




Cash flow t 1.715 1.704 1.718 1.787 1.84
1.79 1.84 2.068 1.842
(15.665)*** (15.513)*** (15.693)*** (14.104)*** (14.355)***
(14.123)*** (17.447)*** (18.015)*** (17.466)***
Sales t-1 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.094 0.094
0.094 0.123 0.123 0.122
(19.526)*** (19.503)*** (19.474)*** (12.688)*** (12.667)***
(12.690)*** (19.610)*** (19.670)*** (19.554)***
State t -0.106 -0.107 -0.167 -0.023 -0.013 -
0.071 -0.118 -0.104 -0.181
(-1.147) (-1.157) (-1.713)* (-0.218) (-0.126) (-
0.631) (-1.275) (-1.129) (-1.861)*
Firm Size t 0.118 0.122 0.12 0.122 0.128
0.123 0.087 0.102 0.089
(5.081)*** (5.190)*** (5.129)*** (4.404)*** (4.593)***
(4.423)*** (3.944)*** (4.566)*** (4.011)***
DTobin’s Q t-1* Leverage t-1 -0.087
(-1.223)
DGrowth t* Leverage t-1 0.181
(2.633)***
DLoss t* Leverage t-1
0.42
(4.962)***




Constant -1.179 -1.26 -1.093 -2.251 -2.389 -
2.232 -0.537 -0.800 -0.455
(-2.054)** (-2.181)** (-1.900)* (-3.810)*** (-4.032)*** (-
3.777)*** (-0.97) (-1.44) (-0.82)
Observations 5999 5999 5999 4186 4186
4186 5999 5999 5999
Groups 1159 1159 1159 1020 1020
1020 1159 1159 1159
R Square 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.15 0.15
0.15 0.21 0.21 0.21
Table 4.  The Relation between Bank Loan and Investment in China (Instrumental 
Variable Models)
This table reports the estimates obtained from the firm fixed effect models. The dependent variable is ti
Investment ,  
as defined in Table 1. Tables 1-3 use Tobin’s Q as the performance measure, Tables 4-6 use sale growth as the 
performance measures.  Tables 7-9 use accounting performance as the performance measure.
Tobin’s Q Performance Sale Growth Performance
Accounting Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(7) (8) (9)
Leverage t-1 -1.206 -1.284 -1.412 -0.993 -1.126 -
1.185 -1.085 -1.135 -1.289
(-3.136)*** (-3.285)*** (-3.640)*** (-2.291)** (-2.577)** (-
2.715)*** (-2.712)*** (-2.848)*** (-3.191)***
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.058 0.066 0.059
(3.336)*** (3.508)*** (3.351)***




Cash flow t 1.635 1.646 1.643 1.658 1.708
1.66 1.728 2.106 1.735
(11.837)*** (11.886)*** (11.920)*** (11.184)*** (11.413)***
(11.220)*** (12.726)*** (13.706)*** (12.801)***
Sales t-1 0.095 0.095 0.096 0.092 0.091
0.093 0.097 0.097 0.097
(11.102)*** (11.096)*** (11.220)*** (9.960)*** (9.931)***
(10.113)*** (11.229)*** (11.278)*** (11.339)***
State t -0.026 -0.021 -0.227 -0.079 -0.074 -
0.300 -0.033 -0.025 -0.224
(-0.244) (-0.202) (-1.923)* (-0.7) (-0.655) (-
2.312)** (-0.313) (-0.242) (-1.889)*
Firm Size t 0.185 0.184 0.191 0.155 0.164
0.159 0.156 0.170 0.161
(5.403)*** (5.374)*** (5.565)*** (4.276)*** (4.494)***
(4.379)*** (4.678)*** (5.117)*** (4.832)***
DTobin’s Q t-1* Leverage t-1 0.104
(1.111)
DGrowth t* Leverage t-1 0.207
(2.354)**
Dloss t* Leverage t-1
0.542
(5.176)***




Constant -3.405 -3.381 -3.213 -2.57 -2.769 -
2.499 -2.839 -3.127 -2.653
(-4.466)*** (-4.433)*** (-4.213)*** (-3.578)*** (-3.831)*** (-
3.484)*** (-3.815)*** (-4.208)*** (-3.562)***
Observations 4001 4001 4001 3522 3522
3522 4001 4001 4001
Groups 1054 1054 1054 993 993
993 1054 1054 1054
Adj. R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15
0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16
Table 5.  Variance Tests of Leverage and Investment between Bottom and 
Top Performing Firms 
This table reports the variance tests of leverage and investment between bottom and top performing firms.  
Investment and leverage are defined in Table 
Variance test of Leverage
Classified by Sale Growth Classified by Accounting 
Performance
Mean  (Leverage) Standard Deviation (Leverage) Mean 
(Leverage) Standard Deviation (Leverage)
Bottom 0.2510502 0.1375996 0.2648042
0.1342225
Top 0.2467677 0.1332412 0.2013437
0.1238487
Variance ratio test    Standard deviation ratio>1
P-value 0.924 1.000
Variance test of Investment 
Classified by Sale Growth Classified by Accounting 
Performance
Mean (Investment) Standard Deviation 
(Investment) Mean (Investment) Standard Deviation 
(Investment)
Bottom 0.2220836 0.4873129 0.269452
0.5530876
Top 0.289112 0.458519 0.3324315
0.4939837
Variance ratio test    Standard deviation ratio>1
P-value 0.991 1.000
Table 6.  The Relation between Bank Loan and Investment in China (Industry 
Mean Adjusted)   
This table reports the estimates obtained from the fixed effect models using industry mean adjusted values.  . Tables 1-
3 use Tobin’s Q as the performance measure, Tables 4-6 use sale growth as the performance measures.  Tables 7-9 use 
accounting performance as the performance measure.  
Tobin’s Q Performance Sale Growth Performance
Accounting Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(7) (8) (9)
Leverage t-1 -0.332 -0.256 -0.442 -0.098 -0.226 -
0.122 -0.309 -0.378 -0.422
(-3.803)*** (-2.481)** (-4.154)*** (-1.007) (-1.907)* (-
1.017) (-3.539)*** (-4.085)*** (-3.958)***
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.064 0.065 0.064
(4.203)*** (4.252)*** (4.187)***




Cash flow t 1.715 1.711 1.715 1.75 1.752
1.75 1.84 1.866 1.84
(15.665)*** (15.622)*** (15.668)*** (13.825)*** (13.847)***
(13.825)*** (17.447)*** (17.595)*** (17.444)***
Sales t-1 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.093 0.093
0.093 0.123 0.122 0.123
(19.526)*** (19.502)*** (19.492)*** (12.502)*** (12.445)***
(12.500)*** (19.610)*** (19.540)*** (19.575)***
State t -0.106 -0.107 -0.106 -0.085 -0.076 -
0.086 -0.118 -0.109 -0.118
(-1.147) (-1.158) (-1.149) (-0.816) (-0.732) (-
0.823) (-1.275) (-1.173) (-1.276)
Firm Size t 0.118 0.12 0.12 0.118 0.121
0.118 0.087 0.094 0.089
(5.081)*** (5.130)*** (5.156)*** (4.358)*** (4.440)***
(4.363)*** (3.944)*** (4.204)*** (4.031)***
DTobin’s Q t-1* Leverage t-1 -0.174
(-1.388)
DGrowth t* Leverage t-1 0.243
(1.904)*
DLoss t* Leverage t-1
0.371
(2.244)**




Constant 1.354 1.328 1.401 0.111 0.106
0.113 1.279 1.301 1.326
(3.726)*** (3.650)*** (3.845)*** (0.475) (0.457)
(0.487) (3.516)*** (3.577)*** (3.638)***
Observations 5999 5999 5999 4186 4186
4186 5999 5999 5999
Groups 1159 1159 1159 1020 1020
1020 1159 1159 1159
R Square 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.15 0.15
0.15 0.21 0.21 0.21
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